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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory relief in which the 
plaintiff-appellant, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, 
in its Complaint sought (1) "a determination of cover-
age" afforded by its auto insurance policy and (2) a 
further determination as to the "legal relationships of 
the parties" to the action. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court determined with respect to the 
coverage question that plaintiff-appellant's insurance 
policy applied to the accident in question and that deter-
Case 
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mination was affirmed on appeal by this Court Follow-
ing affirmance of the coverage question the injured 
defendants-respondents, hereinafter referred to as re-
spondents, moved, on the basis of the undisputed facts 
in the record, for a determination that they are entitled 
to the proceeds of the insurance policy together with 
interest and attorney's fees. The lower court ruled that 
the respondents are entitled to the insurance proceeds 
and interest but awarded no attorney's fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents seek affirmance of the trial court's 
Judgment filed April 22,1974 in which they were awarded 
the insurance proceeds together with interest but denied 
an attorney's fee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 3, 1970, an automobile driven by Tsosie 
B. Yazzie crossed over the center line of the roadway 
at the crest of a hill on the outskirts of Enterprise, 
Utah and collided head-on into an automobile owned by 
respondent Robert A. Rowley, Sr. and driven by re-
spondent Erie T. Jones and in which respondents 
Robert A. Rowley, Jr. , Vivian Twitchell (now Mrs. 
Robert A. Rowley, Jr . ) and Erie T. Jones, as well as 
Cindy Pendleton, daughter of respondents Mr. and Mrs. 
Kent Pendleton, were riding. (R. 1, p. 4) 
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As a result of the collision, Cindy Pendleton was 
killed and respondents Rowley, Jr. , Twitchell (now Mrs. 
Rowley) and Jones suffered severe injuries for which 
they have incurred aggregate expenses of approximately 
$14,000.00 for necessary medical treatment and related 
attention. (R. 18, pp. 2-4) Also as a result of the collision, 
the automobile of Robert A. Rowley, Sr., having a market 
value of $1500.00, was totally destroyed. (R. 18, p. 2) 
The investigating officer's report of the accident 
(R. 18, Exhibit "A") shows, and it is without dispute in 
the record, that Erie T. Jones, the driver of the car in 
which Rowley, Jr., Twitchell and Jones and the deceased 
Cindy Pendleton were riding, did not see that the car 
operated by Yazzie was on the wrong side of the road, 
because of the abstraction! posed by the crest of the hill, 
until immediately before the accident. The report fur-
ther shows that Jones immediately applied the brakes 
upon discovering the Yazzie vehicle on the wrong side 
of the road but was not able to avoid the accident. 
Plaintiff State Farm has not questioned the accuracy 
of the investigating officer^ report or Yazzie's responsi-
bility for the accident. Nor has plaintiff asserted that 
Jones was in any way at fault in the accident. The facts 
set forth in the affidavit filed in support of repondents' 
Motion (R. 18) are not controverted or questioned in any 
way. 
This suit for declaratory relief was filed by plain-
tiff just two and one-half months after the accident. 
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The Complaint contains not only detailed allegations 
regarding insurance coverage but also refers to the 
accident, the consequent bodily injuries and property 
damage and the wrongful death of Cindy Pendleton. 
Further, the Complaint specifically refers to the "claims 
for bodily injury, ivrongful death amd property damage" 
against plaintiff's insured driver, Tsosie B. Yazzie, 
and recites that "it is essential that a determination 
of coverage be made by this Court and that the legal 
relationships oj the parties to this action and under 
the written contract of automobile insurance be deter-
mined." (E. 1, p. 3) (Emphasis added.) 
The Answer and Counterclaim filed by the respond-
ents specifically admits that "the legal relationships of 
the parties (should be) determined." (B, 2, p. 2) In 
reference to the accident and the resulting injuries and 
wrongful death, the Counterclaim alleges that "all con-
ditions precedent to the liability of plaintiff under said 
policy (of insurance) have been performed." (E. 2, p. 3) 
(Emphasis added.) Plaintiff has filed no reply to the 
Counterclaim and the record contains no allegation or 
claim by plaintiff disputing this latter allegation. 
Both plaintiff and the injured respondents moved 
for Summary Judgment on the issue of coverage under 
the insurance policy issued by plaintiff. At the hearing 
on the respective Motions for Summary Judgment plain-
tiff's counsel represented to the Court that the only issue 
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between the parties was that of coverage. He offered, 
in the event it were determined that the policy afforded 
coverage for the accident in question, to pay the policy 
proceeds of $20,000.00 into court. (R. 22) 
A determination by the lower court, following argu-
ment, that the policy afforded coverage for the accident 
in question (R. 9, 10) was affirmed by this Court on 
appeal in a unanimous decision. (R. 15; 28 Utah 2d 426, 
503 P.2d 1205) 
The issue of coverage thus having been determined, 
counsel for respondents requested through plainiff's 
counsel that payment be made of the policy amount. 
Plaintiff's counsel in turn suggested that since payment 
was only a formality it should be arranged directly 
through plaintiff's agent at Cedar City, Utah, Mr. Paul 
S. Searcey. (Transcript of hearing on Dec. 11, 1973, p. 
11) This contact was made as suggested by counsel. 
In the expectation that the payment would be re-
ceived as requested, and as intimated by opposing coun-
sel, Mr. Winder, and the agent, Mr. Searcey, counsel for 
respondents worked out an agreed division of the insur-
ance proceeds among the injured respondents and sub-
mitted the same to the lower court for approval. (R. 17; 
transcript of hearing on Dec. 11,1973, pp. 6-9) 
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After considerable delay without receiving payment 
from plaintiff, respondents' counsel requested that inter-
est and attorney's fees be added to the sums due under 
plaintiff's policy. Soon thereafter plaintiff engaged new 
counsel, Mr. Ivie. Surprisingly, he advised that the 
plaintiff would pay nothing unless respondents first 
gave a complete release of all claims and abandoned 
their claim to interest and attorney's fees. Plaintiff 
refused respondents' written offer to accept payment 
under plaintiff's policy and reserve for later determina-
tion the claims of respondents for interest and attorney's 
fees. (Transcript of hearing on Dec. 11, 1973, pp. 6, 11, 
14) 
Thereupon respondents moved, on the basis of the 
files and records before the Court and with an Affidavit 
and a Memorandum in support, for a Judgment requiring 
that plaintiff pay to the respondents the sums due under 
its policy together with interest and attorney's fees. 
Following argument on the Motion, and nothing 
having been submitted or claimed in opposition to the 
undisputed facts in the record upon which respondents 
relied, the Lower Court ruled in favor of respondents, 
except as to attorney's fees, (R. 22) and entered its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
accordingly. (E. 25) The Court's Findings of Fact recite 
the undisputed fact that 
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From the time of the accident it was readily ap-
parent to persons making reasonable inquiry that 
the injuries and expenses incurred by the defend-
ants Rowley, Twitchell, Pendleton and Jones 
would far exceed the $20,000.00 bodily injury 
coverage and applicable property damage cover-
age of $1500.00, being the fair market value of the 
Rowley vehicle, provided under plaintiff's policy. 
and the further undisputed fact that 
This action was commenced by plaintiff in order 
to obtain a determination as to whether or not 
its policy of insurance afforded coverage for said 
accident and the Counterclaim filed therein fairly 
raised the issue of liability as between plaintiff 
and these moving defendants. 
Now, for the second time in this case, plaintiff has 
appealed to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT DIS-
TRICT COURTS MAY SETTLE AN ENTIRE CONTROVERSY 
AND ENTER BOTH DECLARATORY AND COERCIVE 
DECREES. 
Appellant's position that the lower court was em-
powered to determine only the narrow coverage question 
in this case is not only inconsistent with the allegations 
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of its own Complaint and the Answer and Counterclaim, 
as noted above, but is contrary to applicable cases and 
authorities as will be noted below. 
The Complaint, as noted above, seeks not only a de-
termination of the narrow coverage question, but speci-
fically prays in the broadest of terms for a determination 
of "the legal relationships of the parties to this action 
and under the written contract of automobile insurance.' ' 
(Emphasis added.) The Complaint refers, moreover, to 
the very same "claims for bodily injury, wrong fid death 
and property damage" which are involved in this appeal. 
I t is surprising and disturbing, in view of the fact 
that these issues are raised in plaintiff's own Complaint, 
and specifically assented to by the respondents in their 
Answer and Counterclaim, that the plaintiff should claim, 
as it now does, that the lower court had no power or au-
thority to determine the very issues raised by the plead-
ings and as to which there is still no factual dispute in 
the record. This position is not only inconsistent with 
plaintiff's own pleadings and the conduct of its first 
counsel and its agent but it is unjust. Even now, plain-
tiff makes no claim that on the merits respondents are 
not entitled to the insurance proceeds. Rather, it claims 
that, notwithstanding the lack of any factual dispute, 
the respondents must go through the time-consuming 
and costly process of a separate and useless proceeding 
against its insured before they can reach the proceeds 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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they are clearly entitled to. Coming as it does after the 
plaintiff has already forced these innocent victims, in-
voluntarily and at considerable expense, to resist in prior 
proceedings in the lower court and in this court its at-
tempt to escape liability altogether, plaintiff's position 
boTders upon the unconscionable. Plaintiff has spoken 
out of one side of its mouth through its first counsel and 
out of the other side of its mouth through its more re-
cently hired counsel. 
Aside from the serious practical handicaps plaintiff 
seeks to fasten upon the undeserving respondents, plain-
tiff's position is unsound from a strictly legal point of 
view. Utah Code Annotated § 78-33-1 (1953) provides: 
The District Courts . . . shall have power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, 
whether or not further relief is or could be claim-
ed. . . . 
As the statutory language above cited shows, the 
Court's latitude in an action for declaratory relief is not 
limited to the determination of a single, narrow issue as 
plaintiff suggests. Rather the Court may in a proper 
case such as the present one grant subsequent relief on 
other material issues in further proceedings in the same 
case. Contrary to plaintiff's position it has long been 
established under Utah law that declaratory and coer-
cive relief may be granted in the same action. Gray v. 
Defa, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d 251 (1943). When declara-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tory relief is sought, it is proper under Utah law to per-
mit the defendant to set up his side of the controversy 
by counterclaim even where this may involve relief of 
a nature different from the declaratory relief initially 
sought. Gray, supra, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d at 254. 
Such a rule promotes judicial economy and expedites 
justice by avoiding the necessity of separate suits on 
claims arising out of the same occurrences and trans-
actions and allows the Court to accord full relief to 
the parties. In Gray, supra, 103 Utah 339, 135 P.2d 
at 255-256, this Court rejected the contention that sepa-
rate suits in cases such as this are necessary and stated 
in language fully applicable to the present case: 
We see no merit in the argument that the Court 
in this case should permit the plaintiff to bring 
one action to secure a declaration that contracts 
do or do not give the defendants an interest in 
the land and require the defendants to bring a 
separate action, based on the same contracts, and 
practically same factual matter, to determine 
whether or not either party is entitled to a decree 
of specific performance or to damages. 
After a declaratory judgment is entered, the parties 
may obtain supplemental relief under Utah Code Anno-
tated § 78-33-8 (1953), to obtain enjoyment of the rights 
obtained in the declaratory suit. Declaratory and coer-
cive relief may also be sought or obtained, at different 
times in the same action. 
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Consistent with the policy of the foregoing authori-
ties, plaintiff State Farm filed this suit for declaratory 
relief seeking a determination not only on its narrow 
claim that the insurance policy did not cover Yazzie but 
a very broad determination of "the legal relationships 
of the parties to this action and under the written con-
tract." The respondents properly counterclaimed, estab-
lishing their side of the controversy, and readily con-
ceded that the Court should make a determination on the 
coverage question and also that "the legal relationships 
of the parties (should be) determined." Further, the 
respondents alleged that all conditions precedent to the 
liability of the plaintiff under its policy (of insurance) 
have been performed. This latter allegation has not been 
disputed by plaintiff. 
Admittedly the lower court's initial determination 
and the prior appeal to this Court purposely involved 
only the limited coverage question. But the coverage 
question having been resolved it was then appropriate 
for the respondents to request the lower court, on the 
basis of the undisputed facts, to grant the complete 
relief they are entitled to. Consideration of respondents' 
request by the lower court was not a proceeding for 
supplemental relief on the coverage question nor a re-
quest for an interpretation of an earlier judgment as 
the plaintiff claims. Thus the case of Crofts v. Crofts, 
21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968), can have no effect 
as authority here. Eespondents properly sought to have 
the Court make a determination on the separate and 
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distinct question of plaintiff's liability which had been 
raised by plaintiff in its Complaint and by respondents 
in their Counterclaim. Respondents also sought the 
equitable assistance of the Court to obtain compensation 
from plaintiff for the unwarranted delay caused them by 
plaintiff's conduct. Under the circumstances the lower 
court was clearly empowered and authorized under the 
undisputed facts in the record to consider and dispose 
of the issue of plaintiff's liability to respondents. It is in 
fact surprising that the plaintiff should now contend 
otherwise where it made no attempt to raise any factual 
issue or to dispute any of the facts relied upon by the 
respondents. 
POINT II 
ALL NECESSARY PARTIES WERE BEFORE THE 
COURT AND RESPONDENTS PROPERLY RAISED THE 
ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S LIABILITY. 
A. The question of plaintiff's liability was 
properly before the trial court. 
Under Utah law when there is a question concerning 
the coverage of an automobile insurance policy, it is 
proper for the insurer to maintain an action for declara-
tory relief against the insured to have the issue resolved. 
E.g.. Western Casualty & Surety Company v. Trans-
america Insurance Company, 26 Utah 2d 50, 484 P.2d 
1180 (1971). 
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Those claiming injuries as a result of the tortious 
acts of the insured are not proper parties to an action 
to determine the legal effect of the terms of the insur-
ance policy. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company v. 
Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 R2d 277 (1957). 
AVhere, however, an insurance carrier on its own 
initiative joins the tort victims without their consent 
or approval in an action for declaratory relief involving 
not only the question of coverage under its policy but, 
in addition, seeks a broad determination of the "legal 
relationships of the parties . . . and under the contract" 
it is evident that absent an objection by the innocent tort 
victims the court may proceed to determine liability 
of the insurance company for the damages caused to the 
tort victim. In Chugg, supra, 6 Utah 2d at 406, 315 P.2d 
at 281, the Court explained: 
An injured party should have the right, if he de-
sires, to have his action tried with dispatch and 
without regard to any dispute between the person 
who injured him and the latter's insurer or in-
surers. However, in this suit the trial court had 
jurisdiction of the subject matter and since Lar-
sen (the tort victim) failed to object to his join-
der as a party in that suit and the issue was 
triable upon appeal being taken, the issues were 
properly before us for review. 
In the matter before the Court respondents were all 
victims of the negligence of plaintiff's insured driver 
and were not proper parties to the dispute between plain-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tiff State Farm and Yazzie on the issue of coverage. 
The respondents, however, elected not to object to being 
joined by State Farm but instead determined to permit 
the lower court in this suit to dispose of the entire dispute 
between the parties as was properly their right to do so. 
r
 After voluntarily joining the respondents, the plain-
tiff now objects to full resolution of the contro-
versy in one lawsuit claiming such action constitutes an 
improper joinder of parties and a misjoinder of reme-
dies. However, in joining the respondents plaintiff has 
voluntarily waived any right it may otherwise have had 
to object to the determination in this single lawsuit of all 
issues in dispute between it and the respondents. 
Having elected to join the respondents in this suit 
and proceed in this fashion plaintiff is estopped to now 
object to a full determination of its rights vis-a-vis re-
spondents. 
Rule 18(b), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure, permits 
the joining of two claims in one action in situations where 
one claim is cognizable only after the other claim has 
been prosecuted to a conclusion. Rule 20(a), Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, permits the joining of two claims if 
relief is sought or if a claim is asserted against parties 
jointly, severally or, in the alternative, in respect of or 
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series 
of transactions or occurrences, if any question of law or 
fact common to all of them will arise in the action. 
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This Court has held that an attempt by the injured 
party to join an insurance carrier and the insured in 
the same action will not be permitted, when a timely 
objection is raised despite the liberal terms of the above 
rules, because of well-established public policy. Christen-
sen v. Peterson, 25 Utah 2d 411, 483 P.2d 447 (1971); 
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967); 
Utah Farm Bureau v. Chugg, supra. 
These cases, however, indicate two essential policy 
reasons for the above rule: (1) the well-established 
policy against intentionally notifying a jury in a personal 
injury action of the existence of insurance which may 
cover the claim; and (2) joining two claims with sepa-
rate bases in the law such as a claim in negligence with 
a claim in contract. Young v. Barney, supra. Neither of 
those policy considerations has any application in the 
present case. 
The fact that had respondents attempted to join 
plaintiff in an action it could have properly objected on 
either of the above bases is not material since such is 
not the case here. Instead, having on its own initiative 
joined the respondents without their objection plaintiff 
may not now object in this case. The respondents did 
not join the plaintiff but rather the plaintiff itself 
brought the respondents in. By so doing it waived any 
claim it may otherwise have had to object. In the present 
context of the case, moreover, there is no possibility that 
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a jury will be influenced by the existence of the insurance 
so as to prejudice plaintiff's rights or the rights of its 
insured. 
Nor may plaintiff argue as it does that there has been 
a misjoinder of remedies. The courts are understandably 
concerned where multiple claims are filed with distinctly 
different bases in the law since in such actions the com-
plexity of issues may confuse the jury and may require 
that evidence be received on facts supporting certain of 
the claims which have no relevance so far as the other 
claims are concerned. Such procedure is not prohibited 
but must be reviewed by the courts as a matter of sound 
judicial policy. Here there are technically two claims, 
one resulting from the tort and one arising under a con-
tract. There is, however, no dispute concerning the tort 
or the facts surrounding it. Plaintiff has made no claim 
that Yazzie was not responsible for the accident nor any 
claim that the respondent Jones contributed in any way 
to the accident. Yazzie's responsibility for the accident 
is clearly established. As the record shows without 
question, any claim that Yazzie was not responsible would 
be devoid of merit. Additionally, because of the great 
damage that the respondents have suffered, no claim 
can be made that respondents' damages do not exceed 
the amount of the policy. Such claims have not been made 
here, but if made, would be frivolous and would tax 
heavily the credibility of anyone making such a claim. 
Thus, although as a matter of policy, tort and contract 
claims are often tried separately, the reasons for doing 
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so do not apply here. In this case, where the facts are 
undisputed, where the pleadings of both the plaintiff 
and the respondents clearly raise the broad issues of 
liability and where the plaintiff insurance company has 
waived any claim by itself joining the respondents and 
raising the very issues involved in this appeal, the com-
peting policies of judicial economy and the provision of 
an expeditous and complete resolution of the litigants' 
claims must predominate. Under the present facts it is 
proper for all claims arising out of this accident to be 
considered in this single lawsuit. 
B. All conditions precedent to plaintiff's 
liability under the insurance policy were ful-
filled. * 
In addition to its agreement with plaintiff that the 
broad issues involved in the "legal relationships of the 
parties . . . and under the written contract" should be 
determined, it should be noted that in answering plain-
tiff's Complaint the respondents stated in their Counter-
claim that : 
All conditions precedent to the liability of plain-
tiff under said policy have been performed. 
This pleading to which plaintiff filed no reply 
properly puts plaintiff on clear notice of the claims 
which the respondents submitted to the lower court 
and which are now involved in this appeal. Despite this 
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notice and despite the opportunity to deny the con-
tention and despite every opportunity given the plain-
tiff to dispute the facts in the record on which respond-
ents relied and upon which the lower court based its 
ruling, plaintiff has never chosen to do so. The conclu-
sion is inescapable that the respondents' position, ac-
cepted by the lower court, is sound. Plaintiff's objec-
tions to the lower court's ruling rest not on the merits 
but on technical procedural grounds which are un-
supported by applicable authorities as noted above. 
Long after the coverage issue was resolved plain-
tiff has attempted to claim that Yazzie, the only in-
dispensable party to its original action for declara-
tory judgment, was never properly served. Not only 
is this assertion untimely, but the record is devoid of 
any support for this claim. In any event plaintiff itself 
named Yazzie as a party and it should have had him 
served. 
Plaintiff State Farm represents that it is pursuing 
this appeal to protect Yazzie's interests. Such is not so. 
Respondents have repeatedly offered, in exchange for 
the payment to them of the insurance proceeds, to give 
plaintiff a general release subject only to a reservation 
of its limited claims for interest and attorney's fees. 
This offer, if accepted, would terminate any further 
exposure of Yazzie to liability from respondents. 
Plaintiff has consistently refused this offer, in an ap-
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parent attempt to coerce respondents into waiving these 
claims as to which they desired to obtain a determina-
tion. Plaintiff's concern therefore cannot be for its in-
sured as it claims. Bather, it seeks to avoid its duty to 
compensate the respondents for its unreasonable delay 
in settling these obviously meritorious claims. 
The record clearly indicates, and respondents have 
never disputed the fact, that driver Yazzie has no de-
fense and his liability for this accident is clear. For 
plaintiff to represent that its obligation to Yazzie pre^ 
vents it from paying the proceeds to respondents in 
exchange for a general release, reserving only the claims 
of interest and attorney's fee demonstrates a lack of 
responsibility not only to its insured but a disregard 
of its duties to the public. The parties were properly 
before the Court as a result of the plaintiff's own initi-
ative and because the issue of plaintiff's liability was 
clearly and properly raised, as noted above, and there 
being no dispute concerning plaintiff's insured's re-
sponsibility for the accident, the trial court properly 
determined plaintiff's liability. The record, without 
dispute, shows that all conditions precedent to plain-
tiff's liability under its policy have been performed. 
These innocent victims of the accident should not be 
forced to take further, needless procedures to obtain 
payment. Such a useless procedure would merely be a 
mockery and an elevation of form over substance. 
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POINT III 
UNDER LEGAL AND EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES RE-
SPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER INTEREST 
FROM OCTOBER, 1970 ON THE FACE OF THE POLICY. 
The coverage afforded under plaintiff's policy is 
$20,000.00 plus property damage. It cannot be seri-
ously argued that this amount is even near sufficient to 
cover the damages caused by the accident to the re-
spondents Rowley, Twitchell (now Mrs. Rowley), 
Pendleton, and Jones. Thus, it is manifest that from 
the time of the accident these respondents were entitled 
to receive at least the full amount of the policy. The 
plaintiff resisted payment and instituted this declara-
tory action in which its denial of coverage was deter-
mined to be without merit. The decision of the lower 
court, affirmed by this Court, makes this clear. 
In Utah the right to interest is not dependent upon 
whether the damages are liquidated or unliquidated but 
upon whether the injury and consequent damages are 
complete. Wilson v. Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 506, 174 
P. 847 (1918); Fell v. V. P. Railway Company, 32 Utah 
101, 88 P. 1003 (1907). See also Golden West Construc-
tion Company v. United States, 304 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 
1962), and Wunderlich Contracting Compcmy v. United 
States, 240 F.2d 201 (10th Cir. 1957). In the Fell case, 
supra, for example, the defendant railroad negligently 
delayed its transportation of plaintiff's sheep resulting 
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in the sheep being left for a long period of time without 
food or water. Many of the sheep died and the others 
shrank in weight. The lower court found damages in 
favor of the plaintiff and awarded interest from the 
date of the injury. 
On appeal the defendant railroad argued that since 
the action was for unliquidated damages sounding in 
tort, interest could not be allowed until the loss or 
damage had been ascertained at the trial. In Fell, supra, 
32 Utah 101, 88 P. at 1007, this argument was rejected 
by the Supreme Court as follows: 
The true test to be applied as to whether interest 
should be ajlotwed before judgment in a given 
case or not is, therefore, not whether the dam-
ages are unliquidated or otherwise, but whether 
the injury and consequent damages are complete 
and must be ascertained as of a particular time 
and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence 
and known standards of value, which the court or 
jury must follow in fixing the amount, rather 
than be guided by their best judgment in assess-
ing the amount to be allowed for past as well as 
for future injury, or for elements that cannot 
be measured by any fixed standard of value. 
Although, technically speaking, the Fell case in-
volves a claim for injury to personal property (livestock) 
rather than for personal injuries the reasons stated for 
awarding interest in that case apply even more strongly 
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in the present case. That State Farm was obligated un-
der its policy to pay the full policy limit was obvious 
from the time of the accident since the damages and ex-
penses so far exceeded the available insurance. In this 
sense the amount to be paid, insofar as State Farm is 
concerned, was clearly ascertainable, set and complete. In 
no sense could it be said that the $20,000.00 due was 
unliquidated or unacertained. In this respect this case 
is much stronger than the Fell case where damages re-
mained uncertain until sales were made and market 
prices reviewed to determine actual losses and there was 
no limit on what could be recovered as is the case here. 
Another important difference exists between the 
ordinary personal injury case and the facts of this case. 
Rather than categorizing this case as a claim for personal 
injuries, since Yazzie's liability for the accident remains 
uncontested, it should be properly categorized as a con-
tract action, as was the situation in Fell. Plaintiff has 
guaranteed to pay the limit of its policy in the event that 
its insured incurs liability up to that amount. Were this 
a case where the amount of damages might be less than 
the policy limit plaintiff could have justified its refusal 
to pay until a judgment fixed the amount. However, 
where plaintiff's insured's liability is clearly established 
and where damages are clearly so overwhelmingly more 
than the policy limit the claim as to the policy limit is 
complete. 
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An additional reason for the court to award interest 
is the fact that plaintiff resisted payment and caused 
the declaratory judgment to be filed all without any basis 
in law. I t should therefore suffer the detrimental con-
sequences which the delay imposed upon the innocent 
injured parties. As is stated in 22 Am. Jur . 2d, Damages, 
§190, p. 268: 
The allowance of interest rates on an attempt by 
courts to award compensation to the plaintiff 
for the delay involved between the date of the 
injury (the time that the plaintiff was entitled to 
compensation) and the date of the award or judg-
ment. Since the plaintiff was deprived of com-
pensation for his injury during this period to the 
same extent in tort cases as in actions for breach 
of contract, the general rule is that where interest 
is awarded in tort cases, it is awarded as a matter 
of right. 
While it was the right of plaintiff to force a legal 
determination as to its policy coverage such right should 
not unduly injure or prejudice the injured parties. The 
case here is analogous to one involving a burned build-
ing. At the time the building is burned an immediate loss 
is incurred. If the insurance company chooses to bring 
a declaratory judgment to question its coverage and it 
is later determined that coverage existed under Utah law 
the owner of the building is entitled to interest from the 
date of loss on the amount due him under applicable in-
surance coverage. Here, the injured parties are equally 
entitled to the insurance proceeds and should likewise 
be entitled to interest from the date their loss was sus-
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tained where their injuries so far exceed the available 
insurance proceeds. 
Consistent with the foregoing, the Utah Supreme 
Court has stated that a tort victim has a right to have 
his action tried with dispatch without regard to disputes 
which may exist between the person who injures him 
and that person's insurer. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance 
Company v. Chugg, supra. To disallow interest in a 
clear-cut case such as the present one would only encour-
age the bringing of declaratory judgment actions in even 
questionable cases thereby necessarily involving sub-
stantial expense and delay to innocent victims such as 
the injured respondents in this case. For this reason, the 
injured respondents should not be penalized in the loss 
of use of money which has been undisputably owed to 
them merely because of a plaintiff's refusal to pay aris-
ing out of nonmeritorioiis coverage dispute between the 
plaintiff and its insured. If interest is not awarded, it is 
obvious that in a very real sense the plaintiff insurer 
will be permitted to benefit from its unjustified denial of 
coverage and its institution of proceedings against the 
injured respondents if it can merely avoid payment of 
interest on its obligations through the period of the 
delay incident to the formal judicial 'rejection of its 
invalid position. The insurer in such a case is rewarded 
to the extent of its continued use without penalty of 
the policy amount during the lower court determination 
and the appeal. The innocent, injured parties on the 
other hand must absorb not only the legal expense inci-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
25 
dent to the suit which is forced upon them but also the 
loss of the use of the money they are entitled to receive 
for the same substantial period. In a case such as this 
where liability of the insured is clear from the outset, and 
where the respondents have obviously suffered damages 
far in excess of the policy limits, thus insulating the 
plaintiff insurance company from ever compensating 
the respondents for the unwarranted delay, the Lower 
Court's award of interest should be affirmed. 
For the foregoing reasons, both law and equity dic-
tate that interest be allowed from the date of the injury 
up until the time of actual payment. 
CONCLUSION 
When a declaratory judgment action is filed District 
Courts have authority to settle the entire controversy 
giving rise to the action. A defendant in a declaratory 
judgment action may properly counterclaim and seek 
both declaratory and coercive relief. Such relief may be 
sought at such times and in such manner as will properly 
protect the interests of the parties and resolve the entire 
dispute in question. 
Although it is not generally permissible to join the 
insured and insurance company as parties to the same 
lawsuit, where the insurance company elects to join the 
victims of the insured's action to a lawsuit against its 
insured, such rule does not apply. By electing to join 
the innocent victims in the lawsuit without their per-
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mission the insurance company waived any right it may 
have had to claim that potential prejudice would result 
from this procedure. If there is no dispute on the facts 
the tort action and contract action may proceed in the 
same lawsuit where it is evident that such procedure 
cannot confuse a jury and will aid in obtaining an expedi-
tious and complete resolution of the dispute. 
Where, as here, the amount of damages to the re-
spondents is clearly established in the record to be far 
in excess of the insured's liability, and where the facts 
giving rise to such liability were not in dispute, respond-
ents are entitled on legal and equitable principles to re-
cover interest on the insurance proceeds. Plaintiff in-
surance company has and claims no meritorious defense 
to liability. Plaintiff's attempts to prolong this dispute 
through further useless proceedings raises serious ques-
tions concerning its good faith, particularly in view of 
its own pleadings in the case and the conduct of its 
attorney and its agent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
REED L. MARTINEAU 
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON for: 
WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN 
Seventh Floor 
Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys far Defendants-
Respondents Rowley, Jones and 
Pendleton 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
